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On the Difficulties of Generalization – PCAOB in the Footsteps of 
Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Morrison and Freytag 
Peter L. Strauss*
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board  on the very last day of its October Term 2009 last June, seems torn between1
general principle and particularity in considering important questions of separation of powers in
American constitutional law – just as had been an earlier decision that, in some respects, it both
repudiated and modeled, Freytag v. Commissioner.   Indeed, the same problems live in two2
earlier cases that are staples of the administrative law and separation of powers repertoire, Myers
v. United States  and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.   The Supreme Court has a long3 4
history of reaching sensible results in its assessments of congressional choices about the
structures of government, while having the deuce of a time explaining them.  It has taken later
developments to pick up the pieces.  Its decision in Free Enterprise Fund is only the most recent
exhibit in this right-minded but inelegantly reasoned chain of opinions. This seemed a good
occasion to reflect on the difficulties of generalization and the importance of attention to detail
in this most real of all possible worlds.
WHAT (LITTLE) THE CONSTITUTION SAYS ABOUT THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT
The text of the American Constitution is remarkably silent on the question how American
government should be organized.  It creates and empowers a bicameral legislature, Congress, in
its first Article; an elected chief executive, the President, in its second; and requires the creation
of a Supreme Court, whose Justices effectively serve for as long as they choose once appointed,
in its third.  Everything else – including defining the size of the Supreme Court, its sitting
periods, much of its appellate jurisdiction, the conditions under which it is to be exercised, and
the possible responsibilities of the Justices to sit on such inferior courts as Congress might chose
to create – was left to Congress.  The Constitution quite deliberately omitted to define the
structures of America’s executive government, even while anticipating in its text that there
would be executive “Departments” with “Duties” Congress would assign, and that, as they
exercised those duties, those departments would have a responsibility to interact with the
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693143
   U.S. CONST. art. II.5
   U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.6
    See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: Lessons from the Antebellum7
Republic? 45 Willamette L. Rev. 659 (2009); Laurence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 Colum.L.Rev. 1 (1994).
    U.S. CONST. art. II.8
   U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.9
    This proposition seems quite obvious, but on one prominent occasion on which the Court might have stated it, in10
considering the constitutionality of the Federal Election Commission, it oddly sidestepped the question.  
If "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be established under the
Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of appointment," United States
v. Germaine, supra, it is difficult to see how the members of the Commission may escape inclusion. If a
Postmaster first class, Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte
Hennen, 13 Pet. 230 (1839), are inferior officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause, as they are, surely the Commissioners before us are at the very least such "inferior Officers" within the
meaning of that Clause.162
162 "Officers of the United States" does not include all employees of the United States, but there is
no claim made that the Commissioners are employees of the United States rather than officers.
Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States, see Auffmordt v.
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, supra, whereas the Commissioners,
appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to the control or direction of any other executive,
judicial, or legislative authority. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (Emphasis added).  The issue appeared to have been settled by the formula
subsequently adopted by the Court for identifying “inferior officers” in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663
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President, who was made generally responsible for their faithful execution of the laws.   Rather,5
it gave Congress the authority to legislate in any way “necessary and proper” to support its
substantive legislative choices  and, transparently, this necessarily included the authority to6
establish governmental organs to that end.  Since the very first Congress, Congress has been
creating governmental bodies, not in cookie-cutter fashion, but in a rainbow of patterns each
responding to the anticipated needs of the particular regime being created.7
Separation of power questions arise because, with equal unequivocality, the Constitution
vests “the executive power” in a single individual, our elected President.   What are his8
necessary relationships to the executive bodies Congress creates, and to the officials who work
there?  To what if any extent may Congress share in those relationships?  The Constitution’s text
says very little about this.  It is for the President to nominate, and the Senate to confirm, all the
government’s “officers,” unless and to the extent Congress chooses to vest the authority to
appoint “inferior officers” in him, in the “Heads of [the] Departments [it creates],” or in the
courts.   It would seem that one cannot be an “inferior officer” without having a superior9
between oneself and the President, with the result that senatorial confirmation is required for the
heads of departments.   With the need for confirmation comes both one kind of relationship to10
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693143
(1997):
“[I]n the context of a Clause designed to preserve political accountability relative to important Government
assignments, we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the
Senate.”
The passage from Buckley made an enigmatic appearance in the PCAOB decision; see text following n 88 below.
   Cf. Saikrishna Prakash, Fragmented Features of the Constitution’s Unitary Executive, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701,11
706-11 (2009). 
    U.S. CONST. art. II, §4.12
   U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 1.  This is, simply, a textual reading.  Historically, the clause is a relic of the rejected13
proposal for a Council of State, that was to advise a President making decisions; in that form it concluded with the now
omitted injunction “but he shall in all cases exercise his own judgment.”  Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1796 (1996).  Akhil Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev. 647
(1996) seems confident that this clause, though excised, remained intended – though failing to remark the striking
contrast between a Commander in Chief’s authority and the implicit power of one who merely is to receive opinions from
others who have their own “duties.”  More recent scholarship notes the ambiguity.  Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and
Administrative Structure, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 607, 626 ff. (2009).  A companion piece sees the passage as so
insignificant as to ask “How much should we make of the fact that the President is made Commandeer in Chief of rthe
Army and Navy, surely a directory authority, but outside of that context, the President as a textual constitutional
relationship to other officers only through appointment?”  Mashaw, note 7 above, id. at 660.
  U.S. CONST. art. II, §3. 14
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Congress – the possibility that promises will have been made to powerful politicians other than
the President during the confirmation process – and the political reality that the President cannot
be assured that any choice of officer he might prefer will be accepted.   The Constitution11
contains not a word about the President’s power to remove any of these officers, once appointed
– merely that if Congress wishes to remove an officer, its route is the formal procedure of
impeachment.   And perhaps the easiest reading of its text is that it establishes a consultative12
rather than a commanding relationship with government officers outside the nation’s military.  It
makes the President “Commander in Chief” of the country’s armed forces; as to those at the
head of the Departments Congress may have created to conduct the affairs of domestic
government, however, it says only that he may require their “opinion in writing” about how they
will exercise any duties Congress may have assigned them.   And, of course, those assignments13
of duty are a part of the laws whose faithful execution the President is obliged to assure.14
Against this paucity of text one may pose theories about the necessary elements of the
separation of powers – what it means to have vested “the executive power” (as if one knew
exactly what that was) in one individual; how it may be distinguished from “the legislative
power” that is vested in Congress; what principles are necessary to assure that the two are not
merged.  And one may witness that Congress, acting in response to perceived public needs (and
perhaps also in the inappropriate pursuit of its own hegemony), has created an enormous variety
of institutions that one might think suited to the particular requirements of their particular
    See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, n. 7 above.15
   Kitrosser, n. 13 above, 8/at 630-631; Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 Cornell Law Review16
1021 (2006). 
  Mashaw, n. 7 above, 45 Willamette L. Rev. at 699-71.17
    Consider, for example, William Marbury, whose five-year commission to be a minor judicial official for the District18
of Columbia was the matter at issue in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
    Tenure of Office Act of 1867, ch.154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867). 19
   Kennedy, John F., Profiles in Courage 126-127 (Perennial Classics 2004) (1956).20
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responsibilities.  Reconciling the political theories that might be developed out of the
Constitution’s history and text with these particular, practical accommodations has often proved
hazardous.
WHAT WAS “THE DECISION OF 1789"?
The question who controls the tenure of government officials, once appointed, divided the
Congress and the Nation from the start.  The first Congress, creating the new government,
established some offices that were clearly at a remove from the presidency – those charged with
creating the budget were virtually its own – and debated and narrowly decided that the President
should (ordinarily) have a right of removal.   But was it that the President must be given an15
unfettered right to remove any official who displeased him, or rather that the Senate should not
participate in the decision – even if it did participate in the decision to confirm an appointment.
In the debates, much was said about the President’s necessary relationship with the officers
serving under him, his need to change if he lost faith in the incumbent.   Yet the decision of16
1789, as such, was not to state explicitly his authority to remove, but rather to reject proposals
that would have provided for senatorial participation in removal.  His own removal authority
remained unstated, implicit.   And early Congresses did not hesitate to create federal offices17
whose incumbents were to serve for a term, at least implicitly protected from casual removal
during that period.18
Later, Congress changed its mind on the issue of its own participation.  When Andrew
Johnson became President upon Abraham Lincoln’s assassination, the Tenure of Office Act19
required Senate participation in removals from Cabinet positions, to protect the Lincoln cabinet
from dismemberment by the new President.  Clearly this was both an expression of distrust in
the new President, and an effort to involve the Congress in executive branch business.   When
President Johnson then purported to remove Lincoln’s Secretary of War Edward Stanton from
office, articles of impeachment were voted by the House of Representatives and, in the Senate,
impeachment came within one vote of success.   20
   272 U.S. 52 (1926).21
    Cf. Robert R. Robinson, Executive Branch Experience, Supreme Court Nominees, and Increased Deference to the22
President in Separation of Powers Cases: Signaling, or Socialization? Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610257.
    See, e.g., Yoo, Christopher S., Steven G. Calabresi and Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern23
Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2005); Calabresi, Steven G. and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541 (1994). 
  In addition to the works just cited, see, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, the Removal Power: Relearning Founding Lessons:24
The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 Case W. L. Rev. 1563, 1564-65, 1571-72 (1997), and the critical
account given in  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 761 n.3 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 275-77 (1976)(White, J., concurring and dissenting).
  Mashaw, n. 7 above, 45 Willamette L. Rev. at 669.25
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Subsequently, a more innocent statute provided the same protection to city postmasters.  The
requirement of Senate acquiescence in their removal is easily understood as a political gesture
toward the Senators of the relevant state, who would have had a good deal to do with the
appointment in the first place.  President Wilson acted to remove the Postmaster of Portland,
Oregon without consulting the Senate, and Myers v. United States  was the result.21
The case had to be argued twice.  When finally decided, it was by the narrowest of margins.
The majority concluded that Postmaster Myers had been validly removed from office, because
the statute constraining the President’s actions was unconstitutional.  But why?  Chief Justice
(and former President) William Howard Taft wrote the majority opinion and – perhaps not
surprisingly given the perspective he might have brought to the case from his prior position  –22
his very lengthy opinion is full of emphatic assertions of the necessary prerogatives of the
President as chief executive.  Perhaps not for officials to whom were committed adjudicatory
tasks, but certainly for those performing strictly executive functions (like a city postmaster), he
wrote, the President’s removal power must be unhindered.  The “Decision of 1789," reflecting
the constitutional understanding of the Framers, he argued, established as much.  These
expressions are invoked again and again by those taking the strongest view of presidential
authority, and subsequent departures from them are bemoaned.23
The case is written as if, and is said to have held that, with the exception of civil service
members and officers whose role is the adjudication of contested matters, the President must
have an unfettered right to remove executive officers at will.   Yet the restraint it found24
unconstitutional was a congressional effort to require senatorial approval of the removal of the
postmaster (an executive official) from office – that is to say, the disapproved statutory provision
required the Senate’s participation in the President’s executive action.  Seen this way, the case
gave the Court a belated and welcome chance to pronounce judgment on the Tenure of Office
Act – to place limits on the capacity of Congress to participate in overseeing executive action.
But Chief Justice Taft and the majority declined to take this opportunity, instead writing their
opinion  a good deal more broadly, giving it “the flavor of law-office history.”25
   Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3180 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).26
   Cf. Comment, The Tennessee Valley Authority Act. 43 Yale L. J. 815, 819 (1934), addressing the then provisions of27
the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933: “It must be recognized, however, that a project like the Tennessee Valley
Authority is open to sabotage by a hostile Chief Executive. For although Congress has given the directors a continuing
tenure of office and has provided for dismissals by a concurrent resolution of both houses of the legislature, the
unqualified holding in Myers v. United States  in favor of Presidential removals is dangerous to the Authority's32
corporate independence.” 
32.  272 U. S. 52 (1926). A few months ago President Roosevelt removed Commissioner Humphrey from the
Federal Trade Commission without a hearing or issuance of charges, although the members of that body have,
by statute, long, overlapping tenures of office. N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1933, at 24.
Post-Humphrey’s Executor, the Sixth Circuit confirmed the President’s implicit authority, as to a body which it found
not to be outside the executive branch as the FTC had been said to have been.  Morgan v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
115 F.2d 990, 992-94 (6th Cir. 1940) (“It must be noted that the Act was passed subsequent to the Myers decision which
sustained the discretionary power to remove, inherent in the President, and prior to the announcement of the Humphrey
decision which set limits upon that power. It is not to be assumed that the Congress was in any doubt as to a power to
remove residing in the President as a necessary incident to his power to appoint. ... The Congress was aware of the Myers
decision and its rationalization, for it had aroused wide interest ... .. Had it been the intention of the Congress to curtail
the removal power of the President, it may be assumed that the Congress would not have been at a loss for a formula
unequivocally expressing such purpose. When, in the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat.
20, 31 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.), it was designed to place the office of Comptroller General beyond the Presidential power
of removal, it found no difficulty in expressing that intent. In providing for the removal of the Comptroller, or his
assistant, if incapacitated, inefficient, guilty of neglect of duty, of malfeasance in office, or other stated grounds, it added
to the provision the all-embracing clause, ‘and for no other cause and in no other manner except by impeachment.’  31
U.S.C.A. § 43. ... [T]he Tennessee Valley Authority exercises predominantly an executive or administrative function.”)
See also 39 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 145 (1938); “Roosevelt Message, Jackson Opinion on TVA.” N.Y. T IM ES, Mar. 24,
1938, at 3.
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If thus seen in relation to its facts, and not as the fount of a theory of sweeping notions of
necessary presidential authority, the case would have had few implications for other established
institutions and governmental positions.  Viewed in the light of its ostensible theory, however,
those implications were striking.  By the time the Court decided Myers, not a few important
governmental officials – for example, the Commissioners of the FTC, and the Governors of the
Federal Reserve – were protected from unreasoned presidential interference with their tenure in
office; the civil service, whose members were also in positions of protected tenure, held jobs
such as Director of the National Forest Service.  These positions had no less importance in
relation to the execution of the laws than that of city postmaster.  If aware of these facts, the
majority did not pause to consider the impact of its words on them.
After Myers, Congress did not change any statutes already on the books that the
sweeping theoretical approach of its opinion threatened; but, aware of its warning, one supposes,
it omitted providing “for cause” protection for the tenure of new commissioners when in
following years it created new independent regulatory commissions along the otherwise
accustomed lines it had established with the creation, inter alia, of the FTC.   It did not provide26
explicit “for cause” protection, for example, for the commissioners of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, apparently fearing that – if it did – the whole of the scheme it was
enacting might have been declared unconstitutional.   And the Supreme Court had earlier27
  Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 315 (1903); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President28
and Congress, 20 Op. Legal Counsel 124, 170 (1996).
    Accord Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).29
   “On July 25, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed a letter to the commissioner asking for his resignation, on the30
ground ‘that the aims and purposes of the Administration with respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out
most effectively with personnel of my own selection,’ but disclaiming any reflection upon the commissioner personally
or upon his services.  After some further correspondence upon the subject, ... [t]he commissioner declined to resign; and
on October 7, 1933, the President wrote him:
‘Effective as of this date you are hereby removed from the office of Commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission.’
Humphrey never acquiesced in this action ... “  Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1935) 
    295 U.S. 602 (1935).31
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counseled Congress, in a somewhat different setting, that “to take away th[e] power of removal
... would require very clear and implicit language.  It should not be held to be taken away by
mere inference or implication.”     Was Congress right not to have made explicit provision for28
“for cause” removal protection?  Or should it have noticed that, however broad Myers’ language
– grounded in a disputable theory about what it means to be vested with “the executive power” –
the case could be much more easily understood in terms of the limited proposition that was all
the Court was required to decide on its facts: Congress may not reserve a place for itself in
decisions about removal.   “For cause” removal provisions, like the civil service laws, create no29
role for Congress.  They merely structure the President’s authority within the executive branch.
CAN CONGRESS CREATE A “HEADLESS FOURTH BRANCH”?
The constitutionality of “for cause” limitations on the President’s removal authority came
before the Court not a decade later, and was much more quickly and emphatically resolved.
President Franklin Roosevelt found a conservative Republican Commissioner sitting on the
Federal Trade Commission, and purported to remove him, not “for cause,” but simply because
he wanted in that seat a commissioner more likely to agree with his policy views.30
Commissioner Humphrey resisted and, although he soon died, his widow’s claim for his
continuing salary brought the matter to the Court.  In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,  it31
speedily and unanimously found the “for cause” restriction valid, and thus that widow Humphrey
was entitled to her late husband’s unpaid wages. 
The Court might have explained its decision as a recognition of Congress’s undoubted
authority to structure our government, casting its eye on the variety of patterns Congress had
been following in doing so.  It might have noted that here, as not in Myers, Congress had left the
power of removal solely in the hands of the President, albeit somewhat constrained.  And it
might then have explored the full range of the President’s capacities for assuring the FTC’s
faithful execution of the laws, in relation to its particular responsibilities.  Were the FTC to be
    5 U.S. 137,     (1803)(emphasis supplied).32
    A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).33
    Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 762 (1986) (W hite, J., dissenting) (“... [T]here are undoubtedly executive34
functions that, regardless of the enactments of Congress, must be performed by officers subject to removal at will by
the President. Whether a particular function falls within this class or within the far larger class that may be relegated to
independent officers ‘will depend upon the character of the office.’") 
  "[The] mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifications have broken35
down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a
disordered bed." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-488 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
   “No legal authorization of presidential direction in any area of regulation has been granted.The rise of administrative36
bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected
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treated as a “Department” with “Duties,” for example, the President would be able to require the
FTC’s “Opinion in writing” consultation with him about its important decisions how to exercise
those duties.  Nor need a “for cause” restriction interfere with his constitutional responsibility to
assure that “the Laws be faithfully executed”; failures to act with legality – contrary, say, to the
advice of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel – would surely satisfy the restriction.
Agencies like the FTC are quite distinct in this respect from, say, a Department of State or a
Department of Defense.  The latter exercise a kind of discretion on the President’s behalf that
makes them, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, 
the mere organ by whom [the President’s] will is communicated.  The acts of
such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.32
But such discretion as Congress may have bestowed on the FTC, as the Court would in effect
insist that very day, could be tolerated only if subject to judicial controls for the legality of its
exercise.   “For cause” constraints on the removal of one who is, to any significant degree, “ the33
mere organ by whom [the President’s] will is communicated” would present much more difficult
issues than “for cause” constraints on officers whose actions must be susceptible of being kept
within the bounds of enforceable considerations of legality.34
But this was not the Court’s analytic route.  Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous
Court, concluded that (with a minor exception acknowledged and trivialized in a footnote) the
FTC exercised only legislative and judicial powers.  Therefore, it was not a part of the executive
branch.  Consequently, it need have no relationship with the President.  This left the
Commissioners’ “for cause” protection in place, but at what costs?  Intellectual coherence, for
one: in a government of three branches that it acknowledged must be kept separate, the Court
avoided placing the FTC in the executive branch only by seeming to have put it simultaneously
into both the legislative and judicial branches.  Or perhaps it jumped back and forth between the
two, depending what it was doing that day?   This difficulty commentators, and perhaps for a35
while the Court, avoided by treating the independent regulatory commissions as elements of a
headless fourth branch.   But of course that characterization only emphasizes the problems36
by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart. ... They have become a
veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories much as the concept of
a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.”  Ibid.  See also The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984).
    Three examples from your author’s personal experience:37
During the time he was General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (and, he believes, ever since), the
President’s Office of Management and Budget quite properly sought the Commission’s views on legislative proposals
that might affect it (one of the variety of ways in which the President treated the Commission as within his ken, if
somewhat remotely so).  One such proposal, not so long after Watergate, would have regularized claims of executive
privilege by requiring the President himself to make the claim on behalf of the executive agency whose cooperation was
being sought.  As written, the bill would have prevented the President from claiming executive privilege for materials
held by the Commission.  As much extremely sensitive material about nuclear plant security, weapons, etc., was in the
Commission’s files, it responded suggesting a change in the legislation to embrace the Commission (and any other
independent regulatory commission that might hold such materials in its files).  An attorney in the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel responded that this could not be done, because the NRC was not a part of the executive
branch.
Shortly after returning to the academy, your author had a conversation with a friend and fellow academic who had
been a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  He advanced his view, shortly to be explored in The
Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, n. 36 above, that the President had
important oversight relations with independent regulatory commissions, relations that the commissions had an obligation
to acknowledge.  The former Commissioner recoiled in horror: “But the SEC is an independent regulatory commission!
The President has no business asking anything of us!”
More recently, in another conversation with another friend and former academic who had taken an important
directorship at the FTC, discussing how the FTC and the Department of Justice resolved antitrust policy issues that might
arise between them, essentially the same conversation recurred.  He could not imagine that the President had any
legitimate role.
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involved in connecting their existence with the Constitution.  Now Congress might believe it
could create agencies to administer the laws that were outside the President’s reach – and the
Commissioners of those agencies and others might come to share those disturbing beliefs.37
A decade or so later, when it enacted the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Congress
paid no attention whatever to the possibility that the rulemaking, adjudicating, and policy-
implementing procedures for which it was providing would be exercised both by “executive
branch agencies” like the Bureau of Land Management nestled in the Department of the Interior
and “independent regulatory commissions” like the SEC.  Without a statutory word suggesting
discrimination among them, all were charged with implementing their particular responsibilities
in accordance with the procedures established by the act.  If rulemaking or adjudication was an
executive branch activity in the hands of the BLM when it was implementing the nation’s land
use laws, what was it when the SEC was implementing securities regulation regimes?  And if the
President was required to see to the BLM’s faithful execution of the laws placed in its care, what
excused him from the same responsibility vis-à-vis the SEC?
    For persons appointed by the President directly, by Heads of Departments, or by the courts under statutes enacted38
pursuant to the permission given Congress by Article II, this question had already been answered in the affirmative.
Congress’s power to create exceptions to the “advice and consent” route carried with it the power to specify the terms
on which the positions would be held. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).  As has already been
suggested, see the text at n. 10 above, the nature of the discretion to be exercised by an appointee might be thought to
limit Congress’s power to confer “for cause” protections on principal officers. 
   U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.  39
    But see n.10 above.40
   487 U.S. 654 (1988).41
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These confusions would have been readily enough avoided if the Humphrey’s Executor
Court had seen the question presented to have been whether Congress can give “for cause”
removal protection to some officials of the executive branch who are appointed by advice and
consent.   The power to remove “for cause” is not an empty one.  Nor need it be a President’s38
only possible authority in relation to those enjoying its protection – for example, again, there is
his constitutional right to demand opinions in writing of the heads of departments before they
exercise the duties Congress has legislated for them.  This right is senseless without a
corresponding obligation, at the least, to hear the President out before acting, to have a
conversation.  Whether these and other relations the President may enjoy with them satisfy the
necessities of “the executive power” the Constitution vests in the President is a question that
could be answered case by case.  It was, perhaps, the Myers formulation, and not an appreciation
for that case’s limited context, that kept the Court from this path – a  more difficult path, but also
a more honest one, and one more readily reconciled with the Constitution’s basic structure.
WHO ARE THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS IN WHOM CONGRESS MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY VEST
THE POWER TO APPOINT “INFERIOR OFFICERS”? 
The Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to create exceptions to the default provision
for the appointment of officers of the United States: that such appointments are to be made by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  For “inferior officers” it may empower
the President alone, the heads of departments, or the courts to make such appointments directly.39
Who is an “inferior officer” raises its own set of questions of definition.  Clearly enough, the set
of “inferior officers” must be bounded on both sides.  Some positions – an office assistant, say –
simply don’t have “officer” importance; “employee” is more like it.  Others, for whom no
authority intercedes between them and the President, are too important to be regarded as
“inferior”; it would seem that Senate confirmation of these persons must inevitably be required.40
Half a century after Humphrey’s Executor, the upper limit found an important test in
Morrison v. Olson,  upholding the Office of Independent Counsel.  In the wake of Watergate,41
Congress had established a legal regime in which the Attorney General’s grounded suspicions
that a high executive official, even the President, had committed crime would lead to
appointment of “Independent Counsel” by a special judicial panel; she was then to investigate
  Former 28 USC §§591-98, expired June 30, 1999.42
  “It is telling that Democrats, who once praised the Supreme Court's 1988 decision upholding the law in the face of43
a constitutional attack by the Reagan Administration, find an eerie prescience in Justice Antonin Scalia's impassioned
and solitary dissenting opinion. After 10 years of mouldering on law library shelves, the Scalia dissent in Morrison v.
Olson is being cited and passed around in liberal circles like samizdat.” Linda Greenhouse, Blank Check; Ethics in
Government: The Price of Good Intentions, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1998. § 4 at 1
  28 USC §599.44
    520 U.S. 651 (1997).45
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and perhaps prosecute any crime, under only limited supervision by the Attorney General.   In42
an opinion written by Chief Justice Rhenquist, a conservative Justice who had once served as
head of the Office of Legal Counsel (the office chiefly responsible for the Department of
Justice’s legal advice to the President), eight Justices found this regime to be constitutional.   No
one could or did pretend that the independent counsel performed no significant executive
function; the majority, rather, concluded that the possibility of the Attorney General’s removing
him “for cause,” and his obligation ordinarily to be governed by general Department of Justice
policies, made him an “inferior officer” with a constitutionally sufficient relationship to the
President.  Thus, it limited the sweep of Myers’ language, noting the limited question that case
had been required to decide and adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis so missing
from Humphrey’s Executor.   Justice Scalia, as a lone dissenter, violently disagreed both with the
Court’s theoretical approach to the “inferior office” question and with its application in the
particular circumstances of this office.
In the wake of Ken Starr’s years as Independent Counsel in pursuit of President Clinton,
most might say that the verdict of history supports Justice Scalia’s assessment of the majority’s
application of its totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the particular case of Independent
Counsel.   The statute was permitted to lapse,  and seems unlikely ever to be reenacted.  But it43 44
was Justice Scalia who wrote for the Court in Edmond v. United States,  which permitted the45
Secretary of Transportation to appoint civilian members of the Coast Guard’s Court of Criminal
Appeals.  Now, with only Justice Souter writing separately, he recast the test for the upper limits
of “inferior officer” in a way that can be seen to accept in principle the Morrison approach: 
“[I]n the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability
relative to important government assignments, we think it evident that ‘inferior
officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by
others who were appointed by presidential nomination with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”
Edmond not only accepts the fluid formulation of the Morrison majority; it also reacts to an
earlier, closely divided opinion of the Court that again suggested the difficulty of relying on high
theory to decide the application of our eighteenth century Constitution to governmental
    501 U.S. 868 (1991). 46
   Id. at 883.47
   Id. at 884, citing G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 79 (1969). 48
    See n. 31 above.49
    501 U.S. 868, 887, n.4 (1991).50
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structures of the current day.  In 1991, Freytag v. Commission of Internal Revenue  had46
appeared to raise a significant question whether independent regulatory commissions (or their
Chairs) could constitutionally be regarded as being among the “Heads of Departments” Congress
could constitutionally authorize to appoint “inferior officers.”  Recall that under the Constitution,
all “officers” must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,
unless Congress has authorized direct appointment by the President, Heads of Departments, or
the courts.  Congress had habitually authorized commissions or commission chairs to appoint
the commissions’ general counsel, the heads of their important bureaus, and others with high
levels of responsibility for implementing their programs.  
Freytag itself had put before the Court the appointment of a relatively minor quasi-judicial
official of the Tax Court (a body established by Congress under Article I and not an Article III
court), who, because he exercised decisional authority, was nonetheless an “inferior officer.”
Writing for a bare majority, Justice Blackmun reasoned from the Framers’ original
understandings and purposes that the “Heads of Departments” Congress could invest with
appointment authority must be narrowly understood.   Given the Framers’ apprehensions about
“the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism,”  they must be the47
heads of Cabinet-level departments, “limited in number and easily identified.  Their heads are
subject to political oversight and share the President’s accountability to the people.”   What,48
then, about people like the General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the position
to which your author had earlier been appointed by that Commission)?  The General Counsel,
essentially independent in his responsibility for litigating on behalf of the Commission and
giving commissioners legal advice, is clearly an “inferior officer”; just as clearly, the NRC is not
one of those Cabinet-level departments, “limited in number and easily identified.”  
The Court declined to reconcile its reasoning with the realities of contemporary government.
Having forcefully stated his reasoning (which the official in question in Freytag escaped because
the majority somehow associated his appointment with the “Courts of Law”), Justice Blackmun
then appended to his opinion a footnote as curious and muddling as had been the Court’s
decades-earlier denial in Humphrey’s Executor that the FTC exercised executive branch
functions:  “We do not address here any question involving an appointment of an inferior49
officer by the head of one of the principal agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, the
Securities and Exchange Commission... and the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.”   If one50
believes this footnote, what has become of the text’s history-grounded insistence on the
   One is reminded of a remarkable line from Justice White’s dissent in another virtually impenetrable separation of51
powers case, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 94 (1982): “Whether fortunate
or unfortunate, at this point in the history of constitutional law [the question what limits may exist on Congress’s ability
to create adjudicative institutions to carry out federal policy that are not Article III courts] can no longer be answered
by looking only to the constitutional text.”  On the inevitable and necessary failures of simple originalist textualism
generally, see Henry Monaghan’s magisterial “Supremacy Clause Textualism,” 110 Colum. L. Rev. 731 (2010).
    Text at n.45 above.52
    130 S.Ct. 3138 (2010).53
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necessity of limitations on number, and on “heads of Departments” who share the President’s
accountability to the people?  
Justice Scalia (who has been heard by your author to describe Freytag as the single worst
opinion of his incumbency) concurred for four, rejecting the majority’s “Courts of Law”
rationale, and simply taking the constitutionality of the FTC in particular, and the great variety of
federal agencies in general, to have become established.  History had to be taken to trump
originalism in this case; given all the congressional water that had been permitted to flow under
the bridge, return to the text would simply be too disruptive.   51
Although “inferior officer” issues became somewhat clearer with Edmond v. United States,52
one may note a certain tension in its formulation.  Freytag’s originalist theme, and so perhaps
also its apparent limits on congressional delegation of the appointment power to department
heads, is preserved by “in the context of a clause designed to preserve political accountability
relative to important government assignments.”  On the other hand, that theme does not so
clearly live in “directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.”  In any event, Edmond did
not directly repudiate Freytag’s impeccable originalist reasoning, or the surprising results the
theory attributed by the majority to the Framers might entail.  Freytag’s muddling if reassuring
footnote, an inexplicable repudiation of the opinion’s text, remained.
CAN CONGRESS PROTECT AN INFERIOR OFFICER FROM REMOVAL FROM OFFICE WITHOUT
“CAUSE,” IF HER SUPERIOR IS SIMILARLY PROTECTED?
This brings us, finally, to Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,  argued early in December 2009 but not decided, by the narrowest of margins, until June53
28, 2010, the final day of the Supreme Court’s October Term 2009.  The case questioned the
constitutionality of a particular form of government entity a near-unanimous Congress had
created, with strong presidential support, to oversee the business of public company accounting.
Pre-crash scandals such as Enron and World-Com had revealed the inadequacies of the
accountancy profession’s efforts at self-regulation, and now Congress acted to replace those
deficient efforts with effective external regulation.  This was to be accomplished by a new multi-
member body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB].  As accountancy
    The PCAOB Chair’s annual salary is $673,000 and other members’, $547,000, “nearly four times greater than that54
of SEC Commissioners.” Brief of Petitioners at 49-50, Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., No.
08-861 (U.S. Jul. 27, 2009).
     Maloney Act, Pub. L. No. 719, 52 Stat. 1070.55
    For a general consideration of this scheme, see NASD v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005), on which this56
paragraph generally relies.
    E.g., Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.57
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principles had particular importance for the auditing of public companies whose shares were
subject to the regulation of the Securities & Exchange Commission [SEC], one of America’s
“independent regulatory commissions,” Congress provided that its members were to be
appointed by the SEC and act under its careful and unusually extensive oversight.  They could be
removed from office only by the SEC and only “for cause,” on limited grounds, and following
formal procedures. 
Congress’s choices in creating the PCAOB may suggest both the wide variety of government
institutions it has established, and the difficulties involved in measuring them against the
Constitution’s limited provisions.  Neither any party nor any Justice doubted that the PCAOB
must be considered a “government entity” in assessing any constitutional constraints imposed by
separation of powers considerations.  Yet in many respects – and not only those that excited this
litigation – it is an odd duck.  Its five members each earn a salary considerably higher than is
paid to any person we might usually think a government official, including our President.   Its54
employees are free of the salary restrictions and other characteristics of the civil service system.
The expense of maintaining them, and the PCAOB’s program generally, is met not by the
congressionally enacted appropriations our Constitution calls for to justify the spending of public
monies, but from fees collected from both the accounting industry it is responsible to regulate
and the public companies they audit, in accordance with a budget approved not by Congress but
by the SEC.  While the parties conceded that it was a “government entity,” the PCAOB is not a
“government agency.”  Consequently, its rulemaking and adjudicatory activities, although
essentially subject to approval de novo by the SEC, are not governed by the federal
Administrative Procedure Act and are not directly subject to judicial review under that act.  In
some or all of these respects – respects that were not prominent in the litigation – it is not alone.
The Postal Service, the Federal Reserve and its member institutions, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the Bonneville Power Authority are among the mixed-character “government
entities” Congress has created over the years.
In certain respects, too, the PCAOB resembles quasi-public institutions like the stock
exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers, that since 1938  have regulated55
investment activities in the shadow of the SEC.  These institutions regulate professional
activities and discipline members for violations of the SEC’s or the organization's rules, in the
interest of promoting self-regulation, but subject to the plenary supervision of the SEC.   Over56
the years, Congress has expanded this relationship  “to ensure that there is no gap between self-57
   S. REP. NO . 94-75, at 2 (1975). 58
    Some detail is supplied by a graphic display from the 2008 Annual Report of the Financial Industry Regulatory59
Authority (FINRA), which in 2007 displaced both the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of
Securities Dealers as the “self-regulatory organization” for their memberships, available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/p119061.pdf (visited July 15,
2009).
    See text following n. 74 below;60
   U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.61
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regulatory performance and regulatory need.”    The activities of these organizations are diverse58
and their expertise substantial, supplying disciplinary resources the federal government could not
easily afford.   Operating under SEC review, they control their officers and budget, and adopt59
their own rules of discipline and practice (albeit subject to standards the SEC will enforce on its
review of individual disciplinary proceedings).
Congress, then, was building on reasonably familiar models in creating the PCAOB.  Yet in
the interests of both closer SEC control and avoidance of self-interested self-regulation, it placed
the PCAOB much more tightly under SEC control.   Its budgets and the fees that support them
must be approved by the Commission.  The rules it enforces and the penalties it imposes for
violations are subject to Commission approval and displacement.  Its leadership is appointed by
the Commission to fixed terms of office, which can be terminated prematurely by the
Commission only on a finding of “cause” on one of three specified grounds, two of which
require “willful” misconduct in office.  In these respects, one could say that Congress had
created a new model – an independent commission within an independent commission – and it
was this possibility, compounded by the role of the SEC, that fueled the constitutional
controversy.
The SEC itself, as an independent regulatory commission, has only a limited relationship
with the President.   Its Commissioners, too, serve fixed terms and the majority’s opinion is
premised on the proposition that the President may remove them only “for cause.”   The60
President’s capacity to oversee the policymaking of independent regulatory commissions like the
SEC is, at best, untested.  If Congress in creating the PCAOB made it, unlike the New York
Stock Exchange, or the NASD, so close to the SEC as to have become a “government entity”
charged with law-execution, did it place the PCAOB so far away from the presidency as to
defeat our Constitution’s vesting “the executive Power ... in a President of the United States”?  61
Congress unquestionably has the legislative responsibility to create the institutions of
American government.  Its choices in creating the structures of government over the years have
been highly varied, as particular problems appear to call for particular approaches, and they have
often answered to its appreciation of the need for institutional distance from raw politics.  Yet
there is also the risk that they may embody an impermissible preference to substitute its own
supervision of “faithful execution” for the President’s.  Assessing that risk – protecting the
    Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008).62
    Justice Scalia has expressed no great love for Humphrey’s Executor, even if he has accepted that this particular horse63
has long since left the proverbial barn.  His dissent in Morrison v. Olson, for instance, refers to Humphrey’s Executor
as “gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or historical precedent for the novel principle it set forth, [the] carefully
researched and reasoned 70-page opinion” of Chief Justice Taft in Myers, 487 U.S. 654, 725-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Just last year, writing for himself and three others in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S.Ct. 1800, 1817 (2009), he
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President’s exclusive and unconditional responsibility to oversee the faithful execution of the
laws Congress enacts – characterizes American separation of powers jurisprudence.  The
disputes in the case lay in that risk assessment, and its relation to the Constitution’s text and the
existing, well-established framework of laws structuring the President’s relationship to the
bureaucracy. 
When argued in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, this
question engendered passionate arguments that divided the court 2-1.   Judge Judith Rodgers,62
upholding the statute in every respect, detailed and relied upon the extensive controls given the
SEC over PCAOB decision-making.  In light of those controls, she concluded that the provision
for SEC rather than presidential appointment of the Board members was proper: they were
“inferior officers,” and (Freytag to the contrary notwithstanding) the SEC could be regarded as a
“department” for appointments clause purposes.  As inferior officers of a properly constituted
government agency, she concluded, board members could be protected from removal except “for
cause.”  The Free Enterprise Fund, which was hoping for return to a Myers’ emphatic language
about necessary presidential authority, found a friend in Judge Brett Kavanaugh, dissenting.  His
dissenting opinion hinted at the hope that the Supreme Court, reviewing this decision, would
endorse the position that the President, vested with “the executive power,” must have at least that
degree of authority over agency action as would permit him to remove any government official
exercising executive authority for any reason, free of “for cause” restrictions. He wondered if the
time had not come for the Court to reconsider its acceptance of “for cause” protection in
Humphrey’s Executor; or to reconsider its willingness to accept “inferior officer” status for
officers with major responsibilities for law-execution, as in Morrison.  One could believe that he
would have preferred it if Board members must be appointed by the President with the Senate’s
advice and consent, and were then directly removable by him without need for “cause.”  In any
event, he concluded, to have both of these authorities in the hands of an independent regulatory
commission, already one step removed from presidential controls, was to place major
responsibilities for law-execution too far from the President in whom the Constitution vested all
“executive power.” 
The grant of certiorari in the case suggested that a reconsideration of these precedents might
indeed be pending.  That the case took almost seven months for the Court to issue its opinions,
however, can be taken as a signal of its difficulty.   The majority opinion was written by Chief
Justice Roberts for what is conventionally regarded as the conservative wing of the Court
(himself and Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas), some of whom have shown
considerable willingness to return to first principles in the face of prior decisions, and have been
sharply critical of Humphrey’s Executor in particular.   63
employed a grim simile, identifying as “the lion’s kill” the “power that Congress has wrested from the unitary Executive”
via the creation of independent regulatory agencies, 129 S.Ct. at 1817; he recurred to Freytag in denying any “reason
to magnify the separation-of-powers dilemma posed by the Headless Fourth Branch.” 
In my judgment, however,  there had ceased to be a “Headless Fourth Branch” long before the PCAOB decision
confirmed its disappearance by insisting on the necessity of a presidential oversight connection.  The independent
regulatory commissions are departments having a necessary relationship to the President, and their actions are properly
characterized as executive actions.  See Strauss, Peter L., The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573 (1984); n 36 above.  There remains an issue about what having a “unitary
Executive” means, but one cannot properly contend that functions of executive government have been placed beyond
presidential reach.
   E.g., Gary Lawson, The “Principal” Reason Why the PCAOB is Unconstitutional, 62 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 73, 75,64
(2009); Donna M. Nagy, Is the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An Essential Question in the
Constitutional Controversy, 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 361, 396-340 (2010).  Also: Steven G. Calabresi, Remove Morrison v.
Olson, 62 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 103, 103-104 (2009); Brief Amici Curiae of William P. Barr, Edwin Meese III,
Richard Thornburgh, and Washington Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners, No. 08-861, 2009 WL 2406374
(arguing for return to Myers’ first principles).
 130 S. Ct. at 3162 (majority), 3164 (dissent).65
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The outcome of the case was hardly earthshaking, however.  For example, drawing on the
first phrase in Edmond, petitioners strongly argued, as did some commentators and amici,  that64
the importance of the PCAOB’s responsibilities required that its members be regarded as
“principal officers” of the United States, whose appointment must, therefore, be made by
presidential  nomination and senatorial consent.  Not a Justice found merit in that contention.65
They were unanimous that the SEC’s considerable authority over their actions rendered them
“inferior officers” within the Edmond formulation.  And, again unanimously, the appointments
clause confusions resulting from Freytag’s simple theory, so inadequate for the realities of
contemporary government, were unceremoniously swept aside.  The SEC, all nine Justice
agreed, is a constitutional “department” for appointments clause purposes.  Thus, Freytag
notwithstanding, it could constitutionally be given the power of appointing inferior officers,
including for these purposes the members of the PCAOB.
Note how this seemingly straightforward conclusion leaves at least two difficulties in
relation to the constitutional text – an observation made not in criticism so much as to suggest
that the grounding of this opinion, as the others discussed here, lies more securely in the
particular circumstances presented to the Court than in any particular theoretical structure.
First, since the members of the PCAOB are outside what we might conventionally regard as
the federal government (heads of a government “entity” but not of an “agency” for
Administrative Procedure Act purposes) and since they are paid at levels unthinkable for
government officials in the conventional sense, what is it that makes the members of the PCAOB
“inferior officers” of the SEC?  While the argument that they must be regarded as “principal
officers” having to be appointed by presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation was
easily rejected by all, given the SEC’s tight control over their activities, is it only the parties’
“government entity” concession that makes them governmental officers at all?  Of course the
   Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3163, n. 11 (2010).66
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drafters of the Constitution did not anticipate such variety in government “entities” – the TVA or
Amtrak, any more than the PCAOB – and issues like this, rather impossible of textual resolution,
illustrate the continuing challenges of fitting an eighteenth century doctrine to modern times. 
Second, in footnote 11 of its opinion,  the majority says that while it has decided that the66
SEC is a “department” for the purposes of the appointments clause, it is reserving the question
whether the SEC should be considered an “executive department” from the head(s) of which the
President is given constitutional authority, as an explicit element of his executive power, to
demand an opinion in writing about their exercise of their statutory responsibilities.  Yet to reach
its agreed conclusion, the Court had unanimously characterized the SEC as a department and its
actions as “executive.”  How, then, could SEC Commissioners fall outside the obligations of the
Constitution’s one specification regarding the President’s relation to the organs of domestic
government?  To say that Congress would prefer such a conclusion, because it likes to think of
the independent regulatory commissions as in some sense its own, independent of the President
but not of Congress, either returns us to the “headless fourth branch” or puts Congress in the
dominant position respecting these responsibilities for law-execution.  Neither proposition is
acceptable, given the Constitution’s commitment of all responsibility for assuring faithful law-
execution to the President.   As a simple matter of text-reading, it is difficult to believe that
Article II’s two references to “Departments” could mean different things when both appear in
the same Article, separated by only a few lines.  Functionally, one may observe that the
President’s right to demand an opinion in writing from the head of a department about the
intended exercise of its duties is the only stated relationship he is given to any department, once
the moment of appointment has passed.  Thus, it appears to be an essential element of
presidential oversight authority respecting the faithful execution of the laws by any body to
which Congress has entrusted their administration. 
The PCAOB’s protection from removal from office except “for cause,” as found by the SEC,
was the single flaw the majority identified in the statute.  It found that the “preservation of
political accountability” – that is, preservation of the effectiveness of the President’s
constitutional position at the head of executive government – precluded this protection. The
members of the SEC, it asserted, were themselves protected from removal from office except
“for cause.”  To say that they were in charge of removing Board members, but themselves could
do so only if stringent “for cause” provisions were satisfied – to permit Congress to create one
“independent” authority within another – would be to allow the delegation of important
executive “duties” to officials whose conduct of office was beyond the President’s effective
ability to oversee.  
PCAOB authority could be preserved, the majority found, because this statutory flaw could
be cured by severing the offensive “for cause” removal provisions from the statute.  Once this
had been done, the PCAOB’s affirmative responsibilities and authority could persist unimpaired.
It is simply that its members would now perform their functions under the same possibility of
   Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010). 67
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discipline as direct SEC employees face, leaving “the President separated from Board members
by only a single level of good-cause tenure.  The Commission is then fully responsible for the
Board’s actions, which are no less subject than the Commission’s own actions to Presidential
oversight.”   As that level of control over SEC staff was constitutionally sufficient to recognize67
the President’s necessary authority to oversee the actions of the executive branch, it must be
sufficient for the Board as well.  While the majority said only that it had not been invited to
reexamine Humphrey’s Executor and was not doing so, the necessary implication of its finding
of PCAOB constitutionality on this rationale is to reaffirm the result in Humphrey’s Executor.
In at least some settings, Congress can create elements of the executive branch whose heads are
removable only “for cause.”   The constitutionality of the PCAOB’s authority could not68
conscionably have been sustained without accepting the single level of “for cause” protection the
majority attributed to the SEC.
How, then, could “opinion in writing” possibly be excluded?  The majority opinion sustains
the PCAOB’s authority in every respect.  An explicit element of this conclusion, again
effectively unanimous, was that this authority was authority to execute the laws.  Only on that
basis could presidential oversight, on the need for which all agreed, be constitutionally required.
That is, it was precisely the President’s oversight authority respecting the SEC on which the
majority opinion premised its acceptance of the PCAOB’s affirmative powers, once it had
eliminated the hurdle of the Members’ removal “for cause” protection.  While Chief Justice
Roberts’ opinion cites the ostensible “no part of the executive branch” theory of Humphrey’s
Executor,  that theory too has now been abandoned.  The majority’s opinion accepts the69
independent regulatory commissions as an element of government necessarily subject to
presidential oversight, because they execute the laws.  This recognition, too, is most welcome,
but surely it carries with it such definition of presidential relationship to the Departments as the
Constitution states. 
Indeed, just because it is so accepting of a single level of “for cause” protection, the result
will not satisfy those who take the strongest view of presidential authority – that our President
must be able to discipline any executive officer, and command their performance of
discretionary duty along the lines that he prefers.  For them, even a single level of “for cause”
protection should be found impermissible.  They had hoped that the Court would reach back to
undo the mischief they believe had been done to that view when, in Humphrey’s Executor, a
unanimous Court permitted Congress to establish agencies whose heads could be removed only
“for cause.”   No Justice in PCAOB suggested any sympathy for such a view.  Strikingly, every70
reference in the majority opinion to the President’s constitutional authority invoked his
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necessary prerogative to oversee (as, for example, by removal “for cause”), not to decide, the
actions of executive departments.71
The flaw in the argument of the strong presidentialists, to be brief about it, is that they stop
reading Article II after its first sentence.  But it goes on.  While it describes the President as
“Commander in Chief” of the military – no question here, he is entitled to issue orders that are to
be unquestioningly obeyed, and violation may be treated as a military offense – all it says about
his relationship to domestic authorities once appointed is that he is entitled to “require the
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.”   This power, which as holder of “the72
executive power” it seems he must have over the SEC as well as the EPA,  stands in sharp73
contrast to being “Commander in Chief.”  The agencies have the duties; he gets to reason with
them, as he strives to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  And for him to ignore
those placements of “Duties” in others would in itself be to fail to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”  Again, the question is not whether he is entitled to command or decide, but
what constitutes the constitutionally indispensable elements of his necessary oversight
relationship. 
Despite the mildness of the outcome in the case, the theoretical explanation the majority
offered for its conclusion seems to sweep more broadly than the particulars of the case require.
Apparently deliberate ambiguities in the majority opinion leave for the future the task of
reconciling the ostensible theory of its actions with the realities of common government
arrangements.  Justice Breyer’s strident dissent for the (relatively) liberal wing of the Court
(himself and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens) suggested two problems with the
majority’s “single level” limitation.  First, it is not at all clear that it is violated by the “for
cause” protection of PCAOB members; as we have seen, the SEC statute, it would seem
deliberately at the time of its enactment, did not provide “for cause” protection to the members
of the SEC.  Second, if one looks past the PCAOB to the enormous variety of statutory
provisions respecting government employment, one easily finds hundreds if not thousands of
government employees who can only removed “for cause” by superiors who themselves can
only be removed “for cause.”  The majority deals with the first problem by bold assertion, and
with the second – reminiscent of the Freytag footnote that produced the effective overruling of
that case in this one  – by leaving such questions to another day.   74
The majority’s handling of the first of these issues is quite astonishing, particularly coming
from conservative Justices who repeatedly assert that it is for Congress, not the courts, to make
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law – that the courts are obliged to take statutes as Congress has written them.   Justice Breyer75
observed in his dissent that the SEC statute had been written after the decision in the Myers case
(recall that the conventional reading of Myers was that it recognized as a matter of constitutional
necessity an unfettered presidential right to remove executive officers ), but before Myers’76
qualification by Humphrey’s Executor.   Congress had enacted the FTC’s “for cause” provision77
before Myers.  Now it omitted a similar provision from the SEC statute and others newly
creating independent regulatory commissions, apparently unwilling to take the risk that if that
provision was found unconstitutional, the result would be to jeopardize the whole scheme.
Perhaps its members understood that, in any event, presidential interference with such a
commission would generate enough political heat to dissuade any President from dismissing a
commissioner without an articulable, apolitical reason.  Would it be proper for a court to insert a
protection of tenure that the legislature did not enact, even inadvertently?  
The opinion in Myers suggested the possibility of limits to the President’s removal power for
officials serving as adjudicators – and this reservation has been picked up in subsequent cases.78
But the Myers opinion, the Court’s general jurisprudence before and after it,  and the ready79
implication of the President’s constitutional duty to assure the faithful execution of the laws, all
establish rather clearly that the default position is that the President may remove any Department
head, and Department heads may remove any officers inferior to them, at will.  It took a statute
to create the civil service system; congressional practice is to specify those higher offices from
which incumbents may be removed only “for cause.”  Since there is no such statute for the SEC
Commissioners, even though custom and political realities doubtless support such a constraint,
one would think that as a matter of law SEC commissioners serve at the President’s pleasure.
And, if so, the two-level proposition on which the majority opinion turns is irrelevant, for only
PCAOB Members, and not Commissioners, are protected from removal unless “for cause.”  
What was the majority’s entire discussion of the point, in response to Justice Breyer’s
argument? 
The parties agree that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the
President except under the Humphrey’s Executor standard of “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.” 295 U. S., at 620 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
Brief for Petitioners 31; Brief for United States 43; Brief for Respondent Public
   Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3148 (2010).80
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Company Accounting Oversight Board 31 (hereinafter PCAOB Brief); Tr. of Oral Arg.
47, and we decide the case with that understanding.  80
That is, the majority decided by bare assertion a question of law on which their holding that the
PCAOB “for cause” removal provision was unconstitutional utterly depended – relying on party
choices how to argue the case.  A brief filed amicus curiae, not mentioned by the majority, had
informed the Court of the problem.   81
The failure of any party to argue the point, as Professor Richard Pierce has remarked, can be
ascribed to self-interested motives of a kind that usually are taken as a signal of improper
litigation about constitutionality.  
The petitioners did not want to take the position that the SEC statute authorizes at
will removal because that would undermine their argument about dual insulation from
presidential control. The SEC did not want to take that position because it wanted to
preserve the option of making an argument ... that the structure of the statute suggests a
congressional intent to insulate the Commissioners from at will removal. ... I have it on
good authority that PCAOB wanted to make that argument but that SEC overruled it.
That alone suggests that SEC could control PCAOB even before the majority eliminated
the limits on the SEC's power to remove Board members.82
As Professor William Funk remarked in the same informal Internet forum, “To decide the
constitutionality of a statutory provision based upon an ‘understanding’ agreed to by the parties
as to the meaning of another relevant statutory provision ... is, I believe, as unique as the PCAOB
itself.”83
If one turns to the merits of the two-level proposition, one can find a certain tension in the
majority opinion, one element of which forcefully animates Justice Breyer’s dissent.  At places,
the majority appears to be objecting to Congress’s creation of a “for cause”-protected institution
(the PCAOB) within another “for cause”-protected institution (the SEC).  In this respect, the
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PCAOB is, to the author’s knowledge, virtually unique.  The other such institutions of which the
author is aware, for example the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeals Board of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, have only adjudicatory responsibilities.  While their actions are
nominally to be regarded as executive actions, because they occur in an element of the executive
branch in which they reside, nonetheless these “quasi-adjudicatory” actions fall within the
reservation noted in Myers and drawn on in later cases,  that presidential oversight of84
adjudicatory functions is properly limited in the interest of their quasi-judicial character and
attendant considerations of fairness.  The PCAOB, on the other hand, is not a committed
adjudicator.  It has the same full range of responsibilities that government agencies commonly
possess – rulemaking and enforcement in addition to adjudication.  For an entity operating over
that full range, the argument for presidential oversight is considerably stronger.  
Had the majority clearly held only that Congress could not constitutionally create one fully-
functioned, “for cause”-protected agency within another such agency, there would have been
little to write about.  It is hard to imagine such a conclusion doing much mischief.   In some of85
its discussion, the majority embraces such a limitation, viz.:
The only issue in this case is whether Congress may deprive the President of adequate
control over the Board, which is the regulator of first resort and the primary law
enforcement authority for a vital sector of our economy. We hold that it cannot.  86
Yet in other passages, the majority’s reasoning appears to be about the removability vel non of
individual PCAOB members as “inferior officers,” evoking the Edmond test.  For example,
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion asserts 
 we have previously upheld limited restrictions on the President’s removal power. In
those cases, however, only one level of protected tenure separated the President from an
officer exercising executive power. It was the President – or a subordinate he could
remove at will – who decided whether the officer’s conduct merited removal under the
good-cause standard.   87
   Id. at 3154.88
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 If Congress can shelter the bureaucracy behind two layers of good-cause tenure, why
not a third? 88
In responding to the dissent’s elaboration of the thousands of government officials who meet
Edmond’ “inferior officer” test, the majority does not say that it is dealing with the status of an
institution, but rather responds as if those cases are to be resolved on other grounds, grounds
consistent with a standard governing individual “officers” like each of the Board’s members,
rather than institutions like the PCAOB.
... [M]any civil servants within independent agencies would not qualify as
“Officers of the United States,” who “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws
of the United States,” Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, at 126.  ... We do not decide the status of89
other Government employees, nor do we decide whether “lesser functionaries
subordinate to officers of the United States” must be subject to the same sort of control as
those who exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws.” Buckley, supra, at 126,
and n. 162. 
Nor do the employees referenced by the dissent enjoy the same significant and
unusual protections from Presidential oversight as members of the Board. ... [M]embers
of the Senior Executive Service may be reassigned or reviewed by agency heads . ...
Nothing in our opinion ...  should be read to cast doubt on the use of what is colloquially
known as the civil service system within independent agencies.90
Finally, the dissent wanders far afield when it suggests that today’s opinion might
increase the President’s authority to remove military officers. ... The President and his
subordinates may ... convene boards of inquiry or courts-martial to hear claims of
misconduct or poor performance by those officers. ...  Here, by contrast, the President has
no authority to initiate a Board member’s removal for cause. 
Perhaps the citation to Buckley is indeed a signal that the majority holding is limited to
the heads of discrete institutions.  That case involved an Appointments Clause challenge to the
    Text at n. 65 above.91
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members of the Federal Election Commission, a freestanding body lacking any such relationship
as the PCAOB has with the SEC.  At the place in Buckley Chief Justice Roberts referenced, one
finds this text and footnote:
If "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government about to be
established under the Constitution were intended to be included within one or the other of
these modes of appointment," United States v. Germaine, supra, it is difficult to see how
the members of the Commission may escape inclusion. If a Postmaster first class, Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and the clerk of a district court, Ex parte Hennen,
13 Pet. 230 (1839), are inferior officers of the United States within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause, as they are, surely the Commissioners before us are at the very
least such "inferior Officers" within the meaning of that Clause.162
162 "Officers of the United States" does not include all employees of the United States, but
there is no claim made that the Commissioners are employees of the United States rather than
officers. Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States, see
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, supra, whereas the
Commissioners, appointed for a statutory term, are not subject to the control or direction of any
other executive, judicial, or legislative authority. (Emphasis added).
Saying only that the FEC Commissioners were “at the very least ... ‘inferior Officers’”
perhaps reflected a compromise needed to secure an opinion “for the Court” in Buckley; as it is,
the majority opinion in that case stretches well over 100 pages in US Reports.  Nonetheless, the
Buckley opinion’s failure to agree that Officers “not subject to the control or direction of any
other executive, judicial, or legislative authority” are, indeed, principal officers who must be
appointed with the Senate’s advice and consent, is remarkable.  One supposes, indeed, that, like
the Commissioners of the SEC, FEC Commissioners must be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate and that their actions are executive actions, with the necessary
continuing role of presidential oversight the PCAOB majority insists that conclusion entails.  
As noted above, one of the petitioners’ major arguments had been that the members of the
PCAOB must be regarded as principal officers and, given the SEC’s strong “control or
direction” over their actions, that argument did not attract a single vote.   Whatever may be the91
case for FEC Commissioners, the members of the PCAOB, fitting the Edmond formula, are
“inferior officers.”  On the other hand, they do head a discrete body with a full range of
administrative responsibilities and a distinct legal personality.  What is curious, then, is that the
PCAOB majority did not make explicit that this institutional character was an element of its
reasoning, limiting its holding to the heads of discrete institutions.  Rather, it seems to have
indicated that it would treat the “inferior officer” question case by case.  
This is what makes the Buckley signal ambiguous.  If, as in Freytag, a minor quasi-judicial
actor is an “officer of the United States,” or if, as in Edmond, a Coast Guard officer is, then the
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implications of denying the possibility of two-level “for cause” protection at the level of the
individual rather than the institution are enormous, as Justice Breyer’s dissent principally argues.
The majority’s failure to be explicit about this is regrettable; its promise to take the matter up
case by case is what recalls the tensions created by the Freytag footnote.
Justice Breyer, exploiting this seemingly intentional irresolution in the majority opinion,
details at length the variety of government officials who meet the Edmond test.   Persons92
appointed to leadership positions in independent agencies, and removable by their agency head
only “for cause” enjoy the same two levels of “for cause” protection as do the members of the
PCAOB.  When the majority reasons that by striking the “for cause” protection of PCAOB
members it renders them subject to the same level of presidential control as any inferior officer
of the SEC, it elides the possibility that some of those inferior officers – for example, its
Inspector General  or its Administrative Law Judges – are themselves removable only for cause,93
by an agency itself enjoying “for cause” protection.  The members of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration are protected by “for
cause” removal restrictions; and, as Justice Breyer details, so are a great many of the officials
who head their various bureaus and subdivisions.  It might suffice to say – but this is what the
majority surprisingly did not say – that those bureaus and subdivisions are merely parts of the
larger agency, lacking the full range of administrative powers or a separate legal personality.
But it does not suffice to say that if they are members of the Senior Executive Service [SES],
they “may be reassigned or reviewed by agency heads.”  Not all of them are members of the
SES – the NRC’s chief officers, for example – and all of them do have quite a significant level
of authority, easily meeting the Edmond test.   Nor is the power of reassignment and review in94
the SES the equivalent of removal.
The uncertainties seemingly cultivated by the majority opinion illustrate once again just how
hard it is to accommodate the governmental structures Congress has created for the Twenty-First
Century to a Constitution created in the Eighteenth.  Freytag had seemed to doom independent
agencies’ powers of appointment with its impeccable originalist reasoning about the necessity
strictly to limit the dispersal of appointment powers to a handful of cabinet-level bodies.  After
Freytag, thinking back to my time as General Counsel of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
appointed by the Commission, I had to wonder if my commission had been legally valid.  With
one hand the PCAOB majority has lifted that shadow – what is a “Department” whose head[s]
must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (and who may then
themselves be vested with the power to appoint inferior officers) cannot be limited in the way
Freytag seemed to say.  But the NRC General Counsel’s office is one that appears in Justice
Breyer’s extensive appendices; the General Counsel is not a member of the Senior Executive
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Service; and his authorities to represent the Commission, to write and file its briefs, etc., clearly
mark him as an “inferior officer.”  With its other hand, then, the majority may have said that the
NRC’s General Counsel – or the SEC’s Inspector General – may not serve under the protection
of “for cause” removal.  As in Freytag, only the promise of decision case-by-case in the future –
not the sort of promise one would ordinarily expect to be acceptable to the conservative side of
the Court’s bench  – preserves the possibility of that protection’s survival. 95
The underlying issue, as both opinions recognize, is finding a way of accommodating the
prolixity of government structures Congress creates without teaching Congress how to avoid the
President’s constitutionally necessary role as our unitary executive.  If Congress, knowing it
cannot itself appoint to executive office, could find the means to vest that power in a person or
body that was itself independent of presidential oversight, that line would have been crossed.  On
the one hand, it seems the PCAOB is such a body; on the other, it does not. 
CONCLUSION
In the end, the majority’s solution in PCAOB appears to have avoided large disruptions to the
institutions whose responsibilities were immediately before them, rescuing every element of the
PCAOB’s authority save the formal tenure protection of its members.  Treating the SEC
Commissioners as protected from removal save “for cause,” however surprising for Justices
usually disposed to leave the writing of laws to Congress, is itself a beneficial step.  One would
have to look long and hard to find developed systems anywhere in the world that deliver
financial institutions into politicians’ direct control.  Control of the markets and of the money
supply is not safe in their hands.  This is a judgment Congress made as early as the first Bank of
the United States and continued with the Federal Reserve.  The Constitution does not require
otherwise and the Court avoided the least suggestion otherwise.  
As to the general question what the Constitution provides about the relationship between
President and the Departments of executive government, in some respects matters are more
settled than they had been at the beginning of the year.  Looking at the propositions on which all
nine Justices agree, one can see the independent regulatory commissions now clearly placed
where they should be – not a “headless fourth branch,” but elements of the executive branch in a
different – but necessary – oversight relationship with the President.  The Supreme Court’s most
important function, as Charles Black once remarked,  lies in its validation of Congress’s96
choices, not the opposite.  If a marginal element of congressional choice has failed the test, that
has far less significance than a judgment pulling the string on an extraordinary range of long-
established institutions.
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But of just what does that necessary relationship consist?  Between the majority’s strange
refusal to say, flat out, that its conclusion entailed a presidential right to demand “Opinions in
writing” from the SEC  and the ambiguities of its two-level formulation, much remains97
unresolved.
